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NOTES
The Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing in Alaska: One
Court's License to Override
Contractual Expectations
This note analyzes the Alaska Supreme Court's application of the
doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
As used by the court, the covenant has evolved from a canon
properly seeking to enforce and protect the reasonable expecta-
tions of contracting parties to a doctrine imbued with consider-
ations of public policy. Such application creates uncertainty for
contracting parties, foments litigation and threatens commercial
development. This note offers three recommendations to counter-
act these effects: (1) the court should undertake a fact-specific
analysis to interpret the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties; (2) the
court should no longer recognize a cause of action for the tortious
breach of the implied covenant; and (3) the court should adopt an
objective standard for determining the breach of the implied
covenant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, the law of contracts can be seen as a framework to
guide the enforcement of the reasonable expectations created by
the making of a promise.' Although this is not the sole function
of contract law, "an understanding of many of the existing rules
and a determination of their effectiveness require a lively con-
sciousness of this underlying purpose."2
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1. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACrs § 1, at 2 (1963).
2. Id.
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Consistent with this intention, the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing acts as an implied promise that neither party to a
contract will act so as to deprive the other party of the expected
benefits of the contractual bargain. As Roscoe Pound stated in his
seminal work on the philosophy of law, "men must be able to
assume that those with whom they deal in the general intercourse
of the society will act in good faith."3  Because the covenant
necessarily emanates from the reasonable expectations of the
parties to each contract, as they can be determined from the facts
and circumstances of each case, the duty to deal fairly and in good
faith is difficult to define as a principle across the law of contracts.
The Alaska Supreme Court's initial treatment of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was consistent with the
historical conceptualization of the doctrine.' As the covenant has
evolved and progressed, however, the court has increasingly
employed it as a tool to effect public policy.' For example, the
court has issued broad statements defining the covenant as an
obligation not to violate public policy,6 not to violate the Constitu-
tion,7 to treat like employees alike,8 to "act in a manner which a
reasonable person would regard as fair,"9 and to exercise discretion
"reasonably and in good faith."'" In a recent decision, the court
employed the doctrine in such a way as to actually override, rather
than further, the explicit expectations of the contracting parties."
Public policy considerations have also led the court to
recognize tort liability for certain breaches of the implied cove-
nant.' 2  Because of the policy interests associated with insur-
ance13 and surety 4 contracts, the court has allowed breaches of
the implied covenant in these agreements to sound in tort.
3. RoscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133
(1922).
4. See infra part III.A.
5. See infra part III.B.
6. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123,1137 (Alaska 1989)
[hereinafter Luedtke 1].
7. State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 318 (Alaska 1984).
8. Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050,1056 (Alaska 1986).
9. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220,1224 (Alaska 1992)
[hereinafter Luedtke II].
10. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Alaska 1988).
11. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113
(Alaska 1993).
12. See infra part III.C.
13. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989).
14. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797
P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990).
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However, violation of the covenant in employment 5 and other
general, commercial contracts16 has not given rise to this type of
liability.
The court also has had difficulty resolving the standard for a
breach of the implied covenant, thus leaving the test uncertain. In
some cases, the court has assessed both subjective and objective
good faith to determine whether there has been a breach.17 More
recently, however, and particularly in instances of tortious breaches
of the implied covenant, the court has held that the standard is
entirely objective. 8
Such judge-made uncertainty-both in the potentially broad
obligation to act in good faith in accordance with public policy and
in the lack of precision in defining a standard for a breach-not
only frustrates the intent of the parties but also poses serious
consequences for commercial activity in Alaska. According to one
commentator, an expansive obligation to act in good faith "extends
the responsibilities of commercial actors beyond bargained-for risk
allocations, subjects bargains to inconsistent and uncertain enforce-
ment, and does not produce offsetting benefits in commercial
conduct."'" The developing economy of Alaska is particularly
vulnerable to the effects of uncertainty in commercial activity.
Part II of this note briefly surveys academic interpretations of
the covenant. Part III examines both the Alaska Supreme Court's
proper and flawed use of the covenant over time, and the court's
increasing tendency to consider public policy in its analysis of the
covenant. Part IV outlines the potential adverse consequences of
broad and ambiguous good faith requirements in the performance
of contracts. This note then recommends certain actions to the
court for the future application of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. By heeding these recommendations, the
Alaska Supreme Court would bring greater certainty to contractual
relationships in the state and alleviate litigation about the meaning
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
commercial context.
II. THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF "GOOD FArTH"
Although courts and commentators historically have had
difficulty defining the implied obligation of good faith and fair
15. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
16. State v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 856 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1993).
17. See infra part III.D.
18. Hillman v. National Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Alaska 1993).
19. Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981
DUKE LJ. 619, 620; see infra text accompanying notes 158-160.
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dealing, the covenant has always been a vehicle in the law of
contracts to advance the expectations of the contracting parties.
The concept of good faith enjoys a long history in the law.2'
Greek society viewed good faith as a "universal social force that
governed their social interrelationships-that is, each citizen had an
obligation to act in good faith toward all citizens.""1  Under
Canon Law, the duty of good faith was a universal moral norm,
individually determined by each person's honesty and his or her
duty to God' According to Roman Law, the obligation to act in
accordance with good faith bound contracting parties "'not only by
the terms they had actually agreed to, but by all the terms that
were naturally implied in their agreement."'"
In the eighteenth century, the notion of good faith took on
greater importance. As equity, natural law and the law merchant
flourished, the common law became infused with a commercial
doctrine that "evaluated a party's conduct in contracting by trade
customs and 'natural equity."'2" From the equitable standard of
good faith and conscience evolved a narrow duty to disclose in the
agreement process.'
20. See generally Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo,
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964) (tracing the concept of good faith and fair dealing
through various doctrines in American contract law); Ralph A. Newman, The
Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORNELL
L. REv. 553 (1969) (surveying the concept of good faith across different cultures).
Several authors have traced the concept back to the Bible. For instance, one
scholar cites the Old Testament, Leviticus 19:1&----"Thou shalt love thy fellow-man
as thyself"-as an early reference to the obligation to act with good faith. Russell
A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at
an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 10 (1971).
21. Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-
Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 381 (1978) (citing F.
PRINGSHEIM, THE GREEK LAW OF SALE 87 (1950)).
22. Id. at 402-03; Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a
Standard-L The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment
Context, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (1992) (discussing general history of good
faith).
23. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reason-
ableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963)
(quoting FREDERICK LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW
124-25 (1955)). Corbin also traces the concept of good faith and fair dealing "back
to the writings of Cicero, who wrote late in the days of the Roman Republic the
earliest known treatises on law." 3A CORBIN, supra note 1, § 654A, at 89 (Supp.
1993).
24. Holmes, supra note 21, at 450.
25. Id. at 424-31 (citing Carter v. Boehm, 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B. 1766)).
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The concept of good faith was eliminated from contract
doctrine, however, with the advent of the pure theory of contracts
during the late nineteenth century, which was a period character-
ized by the notions of freedom to contract, freedom from contract
performance, judicial nonintervention, caveat emptor, and bar-
gained-for-exchange. Contracting parties were seen as equals, free
from social duties and authorized to strike the best possible deal at
the expense of each other.26 Yet the notion of good faith perfor-
mance continued to underlie contract doctrine well into the early
part of this century.
In an effort to keep the pure theory of contracts pure, courts in
the early part of this century twisted existing legal concepts and
rules to accomplish fair results between contracting parties.
Analysis thus was driven underground and the legal profession
was misled by the courts which failed to articulate the real
grounds for decisions. Their fictions led to inequity, uncertainty
and unpredictability. Rather than recognizing the lack of good
faith as an appropriate invalidating device, courts masked their
decisions in the guise of interpretation and construction,
implication, want of mutuality, particularized rules of offer and
acceptance, mutual mistake and lack of consideration ...
Because of this covert process, the standard of good faith kept
its separate identity hidden within traditional doctrines.'
As the twentieth century progressed, the duty to act fairly and
in good faith in contractual matters was once again explicitly
recognized. In his prominent treatise on contracts, Corbin asserted
that "when the parties have themselves so far satisfied legal
requirements that the court is willing to hold that a contract has
been made, it will compel performance in accordance with what it
believes to be required by good faith and fair dealing." ' Corbin
elaborated that:
When unforeseen contingencies occur, not provided for in the
contract, the courts require performance as men who deal fairly
and in good faith with each other would perform without a law
suit. It is thus that unanticipated risks are fairly distributed and
a party is prevented from making unreasonable gains at the
expense of the other. This is not making a contract for the
parties; it is declaring what the legal operation of their own
contract shall be, in view of the actual course of events, in
accordance with those business mores known as good faith and
fair dealing.29
With the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") in 1958, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
26. Id. at 385-88.
27. Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted).
28. 3 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 541, at 95 (1960).
29. Id. at 97.
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gained greater prominence in contract law. The U.C.C. did not
impose an overreaching code of ethics in the formation of con-
tracts. Instead, implying terms to a contract remained the principal
function of the covenant." The General Provisions of Article 1
of the U.C.C. declare that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment."'" The U.C.C. defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned. 32  However, when a
transaction involves merchants the U.C.C. raises the standard of
good faith to "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."'33
The U.C.C. definition of "good faith" has been subsequently
criticized as being overly-restrictive: "Good faith ... is best
understood as an 'excluder'-it is a phrase which has no general
meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many
heterogeneous forms of bad faith."34 Under this construction of
"good faith," an attorney can grasp its meaning only by comparison
to corresponding instances of bad faith as identified by courts in
earlier cases.35 Despite formulating the obligation of good faith
by negative implication, under this theory the basis of the duty of
30. Persuasive evidence that the obligation to act in good faith was inserted
into the U.C.C. to ensure the performance of the expected benefits of the contract,
rather than to impose a code of ethical behavior on the merchant community, can
be seen in the 1956 American Law Institute recommendations of the editorial
board: "The reference to 'fair dealing' in the definition of good faith was added
to [§2-103] (1)(b) at the suggestion of the New York Commission to eliminate the
possibility that the definition might be read as imposing on merchants a standard
of due care." 1956 ALI RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 21 (1957). For a greater discussion of a non-
expansive obligation of good faith under the U.C.C., see Gillette, supra note 19.
31. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
32. Id. § 1-201(19). Alaska has adopted this provision at ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.01.201(20) (Supp. 1993).
33. Id. § 2-103(1)(b) (1990). Alaska has adopted this provision at ALASKA
STAT. § 45.02.103(a)(2) (Supp. 1993).
34. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 196 (1968)
(footnote omitted).
35. One scholar compiled a list of such prohibited bad-faith conduct from prior
cases: a seller concealing a defect in his goods; a builder willfully failing to
perform in full, although otherwise substantially performing; a contractor openly
abusing bargaining power to coerce an increase in the contract price; hiring a
broker and then deliberately preventing him from consummating the deal; a
conscious lack of diligence in mitigating the damages of the other party; arbitrarily
and capriciously exercising a power to terminate a contract; adopting an
overreaching interpretation of contractual language; and harassing the other party
for repeated assurances of performance. Id. at 203.
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good faith and fair dealing in contractual expectations cannot be
avoided: "In most cases the party acting in bad faith frustrates the
justified expectations of another."36
Adopting this proposed "excluder" definition of good faith, the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted an
obligation of good faith considerably broader than that required
under the U.C.C. The Restatement provides that "[e]very contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement., 37 The Restatement definition
of "good faith and fair dealing" continues to reflect a concern with
the expectations of contracting parties: "Good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct character-
ized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. '3' Additionally,
the Restatement adopts an even more descriptive definition of the
obligation of good faith: "Subterfuges and evasions violate the
obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor
believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further:
bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing
may require more than honesty.
39
Subsequent analysis has attempted to refine the obligation of
good faith by developing approaches to assess the reasonable
expectations of the parties. Commentators have criticized the
"excluder" approach on grounds that it "presupposes that the legal
phrase 'good faith' cannot be comprehensively known in the first
instance, that judges are to apply intuitively the good-faith obliga-
tion, and that their decisions are to be taken as correct and will
give the correct meaning to this term prospectively."4  The
argument continues that good faith "has a common core of
meaning consisting of a spectrum of related, objective qualities."'"
It has been argued that good faith encompasses an elastic standard,
depending on analysis of objective elements that include the
informal behavior of contracting parties and their individual
expectations; the nature and requirements of the particular
transaction; the fairness of the customary commercial or social
standard for measuring conduct; the modern policy of flexibility in
commercial intercourse; the effect of the decision of the court on
36. Id. at 263.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 (1981).
38. Id. cmt. a.
39. Id. cmt. d.
40. Holmes, supra note 21, at 401.
41. Id. at 402 (footnote omitted).
1994]
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commerce or society; and the conceptual history of good faith from
sources such as the law merchant, common law, equity and civil law
systems.42 The meaning of good faith in a particular transaction
would therefore depend on the analysis of these objective factors.
Another perspective advocates a further expansion of the
analysis of good faith in contracts, suggesting that the cost of
performance to the promisor be used as an additional factor to be
considered.43 One scholar notes that:
[T]he courts employ the good faith performance doctrine to
effectuate the intentions of the parties, or to protect their
reasonable expectations. Standards expressed in these terms,
however, are of little aid in applying the doctrine. They direct
the inquiry away from duties imposed upon the parties irrespec-
tive of their assent. But they direct attention to the amorphous
totality of the factual circumstances at the time of formation, and
fail to distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts within that realm.
The analysis would be advanced further by an operational
standard that respects the autonomy of contract parties and calls
the relevant facts to the foreground of the totality of the
circumstances.44
The promisor's expected cost of performance provides such an
operational standard: "Bad faith performance occurs precisely when
discretion is used to recapture opportunities forgone upon contract-
ing-when the discretion-exercising party refuses to pay the
expected cost of performance., 45
This analytical framework is consistent with the modern
doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As
stated by Corbin, "good faith in contracting is ... a group of
specific rules which evolved to insure that the basic purpose of
contract law is carried out, the protection of reasonable expecta-
tions of parties induced by promises." In determining the
meaning of the obligation to act in good faith in a given instance,
a judge needs only to ensure that performance of the contract
reflects the other party's expectations. Criticizing the hesitancy
of some courts to recognize the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing out of fear that they would be opening a "Pandora's
Box," Corbin recites the basic principle of the covenant: "Such an
42. Id. at 405-06.
43. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach
of Contract]. See also Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a
Contract A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IowA L. REv. 497 (1984).
44. Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 43, at 371-72 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 373.
46. 3A CoRBrN, supra note 1, § 654A, at 87 (Supp. 1992).
47. Id.
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implied term does nothing more than enforce ordinary commercial
standards in contracts that, for whatever reason, do not specify
particular terms regarding the procedure of the deal, as opposed to
the substance of the deal." 48
III. THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN
ALASKA
A. The Alaska Supreme Court's Initial Use of the Doctrine
The Alaska Supreme Court' initial application of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was straightforward. In
Guin v. Ha,49 the court recognized the doctrine, holding that "[i]n
every contract, including policies of insurance, there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do
anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement."5 Consistent with its definition of the
covenant in accordance with the expectations of the parties, the
court held that in the context of insurance contracts the covenant
encompasses an insurer's obligation "to accept reasonable offers of
settlement in a prompt fashion,"'" and the insured's obligation to
"cooperat[e] fully with his insurer."52 Thus, assuming that these
expectations arise in every insurance contract, the Alaska Supreme
Court properly used the covenant to further the expectations of the
parties.5 3
The court has readily employed the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in ordinary commercial disputes. 4 The
court's analysis in Gordon v. Foster, Garner & Williams 5 reflects
the intensely factual nature of the inquiry when invoking the
doctrine in the commercial context. Gordon involved a dispute
over the breach of a lease. The potential lessee had allegedly
failed to make a good faith effort to satisfy a lease contingency to
48. Id.
49. 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979).
50. Id. at 1291 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173
(Cal. 1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Cal.
1958)).
51. Id.
52. IL
53. For a similarly correct analysis of the covenant in the context of the
obligation of an insurance company to settle claims fairly, see Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. H.C. Price Co., 694 P.2d 782 (Alaska 1985).
54. See, e.g., Fairbanks Builders, Inc. v. Morton DeLima, Inc., 483 P.2d 194
(Alaska 1971).
55. 785 P.2d 1196 (Alaska 1990).
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renegotiate the lease's insurance provisions. 6 In reversing the
grant of summary judgment for the lessor, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regardin§
whether the lessee satisfied the obligation to act in good faith.
Because the lessee did in fact undertake an effort to obtain
insurance, resolution of these issues turned on whether "the
insurance renegotiation provision is construed to require [the
lessee] to 'negotiate' with third party insurance agents" or whether
that provision "is construed to require [the lessee] successfully to
renegotiate the insurance provisions of the lease."58 The duty to
act fairly and in good faith could not be defined until the intentions
of the contracting parties were adequately determined.
In ordinary, non-commercial contract disputes, the court has
continued to apply the covenant to ensure that the end result
accords with the expectations of the contracting parties. A recent
example of such a correct application of the doctrine can be found
in Keffer v. Keffer 9 Keffer involved the terms of a divorced
couple's spousal support agreement. The agreement required the
ex-husband to make support payments to his ex-wife twice a month
based on his income. However, income earned "outside of [his]
primary place of employment," would not be included in the
calculation of support.6' When his job was eliminated, the ex-
husband became eligible for retirement benefits and elected to
receive one lump-sum payment.6 He then claimed that his
retirement terminated his obligation to make support payments and
that interest earnings on his retirement payment were not to be
included in calculation of spousal support.62 Interpreting the
contract as an expression of the parties' expectations regarding how
support would be calculated, the court agreed with the ex-husband,
holding that "[h]is salary included only what he earned from his
primary place of employment. As long as [the ex-husband], acting
in good faith, is not employed, he is not obligated to support [his
former spouse]."'63 The court noted that if the ex-husband had
quit his job, he would have violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing,' 4 because such action would have deprived
the ex-wife of her expected benefits under the contract. According
56. Id. at 1198-99.
57. Id. at 1199.
58. Id.
59. 852 P.2d 394 (Alaska 1993).
60. Id. at 395.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Id. at 397.
63. Id. at 399.
64. Id. at 398.
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to the court, however, the ex-husband could not be faulted for
discontinuing support of his ex-wife due to his forced retirement.'
The court stated that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing prohibits only discretionary actions outside the realm of
party expectations.66
The Alaska Supreme Court has also linked the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to the reasonable expectations of the
parties in the context of employment contracts. For example, in
Mitford v. de Lasala,67 the court held that the implied covenant
prohibited employers from firing an employee to prevent that
individual from sharing in future profits, pursuant to the employ-
ment agreement.68 Stating that it seeks to "give effect to ... the
reasonable expectations of the parties" in interpreting contracts,69
the court again took an expectation-oriented approach.
Similarly, in Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hospital,7 ° the
court defined the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
accordance with contractual intentions as determined from the
circumstances of the case. In Jones, a terminated nurse sued her
former employer for wrongful termination and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The nurse alleged
that the employer had denied her access to grievance procedures
that had been provided to other employees.7 The Alaska
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the employer, ruling that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing had not been breached." The court held that an
employee manual was the embodiment of expectations pertaining
to grievance procedures, and that "[t]he 1978 manual clearly
excludes supervisory personnel from grievance procedures. Thus,
65. Id.
66. For other cases involving the Alaska Supreme Court's appropriate use the
implied covenant to prevent the deprivation of the expected benefits of one party
under a contract, see Frontier Cos. of Alaska v. Jack White Co., 818 P.2d 645
(Alaska 1991) (finding breach of the covenant where sale of property during
period of exclusive listing agreement was not disclosed to broker); Ranier Fund,
Inc. v. Blomfield Real Estate Co., 717 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1986) (holding that
building manager breached the covenant by refusing to pay broker commission for
lease of office space after initiation of performance by broker had created option
contract for broker); A & G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging, 547 P.2d 1207
(Alaska 1976) (holding that the covenant would be breached where one party was
forced to agree by means of wrongful threat, thus precluding exercise of free will).
67. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
68. Id. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1005.
70. 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989).
71. Id. at 784.
72. Id. at 789.
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[the plaintiffj has not been denied any benefit of her employment
agreement." The court, thus, again interpreted the implied
covenant as emanating from the expectations of the parties in an
employment relationship.74
B. Evolution of the Covenant to "Act Ethically"
The Alaska Supreme Court has, on occasion, strayed from its
"expectations" standard, as first prescribed in Guin v. Ha,75 for
invoking the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
court has increasingly used the implied covenant as a tool for
furthering social policy. In so doing, the court has imposed
something of a code of ethics into the law of contracts above and
beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties.
The origin of this trend can be found in State v. Haley.76 In
Haley, a legislative research assistant brought an action against the
state seeking back pay, reinstatement and declaratory relief. She
had been discharged because of a statement she made concerning
a matter before the legislature and for her refusal to refrain from
making similar future public statements.77 The court determined
that a termination based on the past statement of an employee or
her refusal to refrain from making further public statements was
unconstitutional.78 The court extended its analysis, however, by
stating "that when the State fires an employee for an unconstitu-
tional reason, this amounts to unfair dealing as a matter of law and
gives rise to contract remedies., 79  By introducing the law of
contracts to this situation and holding that a termination in
violation of the Constitution amounts to unfair dealing as a matter
of law, regardless of the expectations of the parties, the court
exposed the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to improper
considerations."0
73. Id.
74. See also Klondike Indus. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161, 1170 (Alaska 1987)
(holding that employer could not be found to have breached the implied covenant
based on "the totality of the circumstances").
75. 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979). See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying
text.
76. 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984).
77. Id. at 308-10.
78. Id. at 314-15.
79. Id. at 318.
80. The general principle that a public employee cannot be fired for an
unconstitutional reason was embraced again in Wickwire v. State, 725 P.2d 695
(Alaska 1986). See also Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155
(Alaska 1989) (holding that claim of retaliatory discharge gives rise to cause of
action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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The court further expanded the boundaries of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Knight v. American
Guard & Alert, Inc.8 In affirming the lower court's refusal to
grant a directed verdict for the employer in a claim of wrongful
termination, the court explicitly recognized that violations of public
policy in the employment context may violate the implied covenant.
Specifically, the court stated that:
[A]lleged termination in violation of public policy, is in accord
with a theory of recovery accepted in many states. We have
never rejected the public policy theory. Indeed, it seems that the
public policy approach is largely encompassed within the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.. .. '
By injecting notions of public policy into the analysis of the
covenant, the court moved the doctrine down a path of uncertain-
ty.83
The court's inconsistent application of the implied covenant is
further illustrated by Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. 4 In
affirming a directed verdict for the employer against an employee's
claim for wrongful termination for fighting, the court appeared to
have used the implied covenant of good faith to protect the
expressed expectations in the contract: "Alyeska's company rules
expressly state that discipline, including termination, will result
from fighting on Alyeska property. The trial court correctly
determined that reasonable jurors must conclude that Rutledge
fought on company property and that fighting was a terminable
offense."8  Such an explicit company policy would necessarily
seem to be included in the expectations of the employee, thus
supporting the court's analysis. However, the court further stated
that, "Rutledge also alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to
allow evidence of Alyeska's previous discipline in prior incidents of
fighting. Such evidence would have been relevant as tending to
show a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
8 6
The court was correct in its assertion that evidence of how other
similarly-situated employees were disciplined would affect the
reasonable expectations of the employee. Rutledge is objectionable,
though, because it has been subsequently characterized as standing
81. 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986).
82. Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
83. See generally Thomas P. Owens, Note, Employment at Will in Alaska: The
Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L. REv. 269 (1989).
84. 727 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1986).
85. Id at 1056.
86. Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880,
897 (Mich. 1980); Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241,208 Cal.Rptr.
524 (Cal. App. 1984), for the duty to treat like employees alike).
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for the idea that the implied covenant requires an employer to treat
all similarly-situated employees alike;' however, interpretation of
the implied covenant demands a greater factual inquiry into the
expectations of the parties, not a standard definition that an
employer must treat all similarly-situated employees alike. Thus,
the court incorrectly broadened the scope of the implied covenant
beyond the specific expectations of the contracting parties.
The court introduced even greater uncertainty into the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Luedtke v. Nabors
Alaska Drilling, Inc. ("Luedtke P').' In that case, two former
employees brought an action against their former employer
challenging their dismissal for refusing to submit to urinalysis
screening for drug use. 9 Although holding that the implied
covenant had not been breached in this particular case, the court
further subjected the covenant to general considerations of public
policy by concluding that:
[T]here is a public policy supporting the protection of employee
privacy. Violation of that policy by an employer may rise to the
level of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. However, the competing public concern for employee
safety present in the case at bar leads us to hold that [the
employer's] actions did not breach the implied covenant."
The court further stated that "[w]here the public policy supporting
the [employees'] privacy in off-duty activities conflicts with the
public policy supporting the protection of the health and safety of
other workers, and even the [employees] themselves, the health and
safety concerns are paramount.""1 However, the court could have
reached the same result, based on the factual record of the case, by
merely looking to the parties' reasonable expectations and not
considering notions of public policy. Luedtke I illustrates the
87. See Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789 n.6 (Alaska
1989).
88. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
89. Id. at 1124-25.
90. Id. at 1130.
91. Id. at 1136. The court even defined "public policy" so as to illustrate the
arbitrariness that the concept can have when imposed in the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing: "'There is no precise definition of the term [public
policy]. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just
and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the
State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial
decisions.' Id. at 1132 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981)). For a general criticism of the court's expansive notion
of "public policy," see Scott J. Nordstrand & Paul D. Seyferth, Private Rights
Versus Public Power: The Role of State Action in Alaska Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 7 ALAsKA L. REv. 299, 329 (1990).
[Vol. 11:1
1994] IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 49
problematic ramifications of an expansive obligation of good faith,
as practitioners analyzing the holding are forced to use only their
judgment in determining whether a court will decide that the
actions of contractually-bound parties are in accordance with public
policy.
Returning to the same factual dispute in Luedtke 11,9 the
court again painted the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in
broad strokes. After discussing prior Alaska cases dealing with the
doctrine, the court stated that "the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing... requires the parties to act in a manner which a reason-
able person would regard as fair."'93 Consistent with this concep-
tion of good faith as incorporating a broad obligation of fairness,
the court held that the suspension of the employee due to the
results of a drug test breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.' The court reasoned that the suspension of the employ-
ee was "objectively unfair" because (1) the employee was tested for
drug use without prior notice, (2) no other employee was similarly
tested and (3) the employer suspended the employee immediately
upon learning the results of the test.' The court could have
reached the same result by interpreting the contract in light of the
parties' reasonable expectations and finding that an employee could
reasonably expect to have notice of a drug-testing program that
could violate his or her right to privacy.96
Bauer v. Blomfield Co.' also illustrates the court's inconsis-
tent use of the covenant. In Bauer, the plaintiff had entered into
a loan agreement with certain members of a partnership, under
which default by the partners would entitle the plaintiff to receive
all of the partners' "right, title, and interest" in the Blomfield
Company/Holden Joint Venture. Upon default, the partners
assigned to the plaintiff "that part of the partnership contract that
entitled [them] to receive distributions."" The plaintiff filed suit
against the Blomfield Company, however, when the partnership,
without his consent, paid one partner a commission for negotiating
lease extensions. The plaintiff claimed a breach of the implied
92. 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992).
93. Id. at 1224. The court also stated that "an employer's discretion must be
'exercised reasonably and in good faith' and that the employer's decisions must be
made 'fairly and in good faith."' Id. at 1224 (quoting ARCO Alaska, Inc. v.
Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Alaska 1988)).
94. Id. at 1226.
95. Id.
96. See infra part IV.A.
97. 849 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1993).
98. Id. at 1366.
99. Id. at 1369 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing in his. contract to receive
partnership distributions."°  The court held, by a three-to-two
decision, that the plaintiff had not been made a de facto partner,
and that, therefore, he was entitled to receive only those partner-
ship profits that the prior partners would have otherwise re-
ceived.'' The majority refused to consider whether the partner-
ship had acted in bad faith by deciding to issue a commission. The
court stated that to examine the propriety of the partnership's
decision-making process would undermine the legislative intent to
insulate partners from the influence of those parties with minimal
or no interest in the business."° Thus, the court found that there
had been no breach of the covenant.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Matthews, joined by Chief
Justice Rabinowitz, argued that the majority had erred by refusing
to determine whether the partnership had breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 3 Describing the cove-
nant as "'a hybrid of social policy and an effort to further the
expectations of the contracting parties that the promises will be
executed in good faith,""' the dissent pointed out that the only
evidence on the issue of good faith was the testimony of the
recipient of the commission, who claimed that his commission was
at the standard rate.0 5 The dissenting justices argued that a
greater factual inquiry was necessary and that the case should be
remanded "for a... determination of whether or not the decision
by the partners to pay [the] 'commission' was made in good
faith.' ' 0 6 Such a detailed, fact-specific inquiry would have been
the appropriate course for the court to take in Bauer, as the
covenant derives from the expectations of the parties-here, the
plaintiff's expectation being that the partners would not deprive
him of his share of the profits by making unreasonable commission
payments.
The Alaska Supreme Court's flawed use of the covenant
reached a pinnacle in CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance
100. Id. at 1366-67.
101. Id. at 1367 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.220(a) (1993)).
102. Id. at 1367 n.2 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.220(a) (1993)).
103. Id at 1369-70 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1369 (Matthews, J., dissenting) (quoting Alaska Pac. Assurance Co.
v. Collins, 794. P.2d 936, 947 (Alaska 1990)). Although the approach of the
dissenting justices in making a factual inquiry is appropriate, the description of the
covenant in terms of social policy again potentially expands the obligation of good
faith into uncertain territory.
105. Id at 1369 n.7 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
106. Id at 1370 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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Corp.'°' CHI, an insurance company, was sued by a customer
claiming negligent and intentional misrepresentation." 8 Employ-
ers, which had sold liability insurance to CHI that covered negli-
gence, agreed to defend CHI but reserved its right to deny
coverage for any intentional misrepresentation uncovered at
trial."° CHI rejected Employers' offer and filed suit, claiming
that the reservation of rights created a conflict of interest that
entitled it to select independent counsel at the insurer's ex-
pense.1
10
Adapting the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to achieve an equitable solution, the court agreed with CHI,
holding "that the insured should have the unilateral right to select
independent counsel" because of the potential conflicts of interest
that could arise where the interests of the insured and the insurer
were contrary to one another."' The insured's selection of
independent counsel, however, would be governed by the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court held, requiring
"that the insured select an attorney who is, by experience and
training, reasonably thought to be competent to conduct the
defense.""' As a measure to prevent over-billing and over-
litigation, the insurer would be required to pay only the reasonable
costs of the insured's defense."' According to the court, "such
a result, in our view, fairly balances the interest of the in-
sured-being defended by competent counsel of undivided
loyalty-with the interests of the insurer-having the defense of the
insured conducted by competent counsel.""' 4
While striving to strike a "fair balance" between competing
interests, the court failed to use the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to further the expectations of the parties, and thus
nullified a contractual right. The insurance policy in CHI had
provided:
The Corporation, in the Insured's name and behalt shall have
the right to investigate, defend and conduct settlement negotia-
tions in any claim or suit ....
The Insured shall not admit liability for, or make any voluntary
settlement, or incur any costs or expenses in connection with any
107. 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993). For a more detailed analysis of the court's
decision in CHI, see Earl M. Sutherland, One Client, One Defense: Revisiting CI
with the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1994).
108. Id. at 1114.
109. Id
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1121.
112. IL
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
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claim involving payment by the Corporation, except with the
written consent of the Corporation."5
Based on this language, it is apparent that the insurance company
had a contractual expectation of participating, at least to some
extent, in the selection of counsel for the insured. Yet the court's
interpretation of the implied covenant entirely disregarded this
expectation in the name of furthering public policy and fair-
ness.
116
In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Moore
explained that "[e]ven if the right to defend provision is deemed
ambiguous and is therefore construed against the insurer, it is not
necessary to extinguish the right entirely.""' 7 Consistent with the
purpose of contract interpretation-to effect the expectations of the
contracting parties-"Employers' right to participate in CHI's
defense should encompass, at a minimum, the right to have a role
in the selection of defense counsel.""' As Justice Moore pointed
out, the court should have held "that the insurer has the right to
approve the counsel selected by the insured, but that the insurer
may not unreasonably withhold such approval.""' 9 Applied in
this manner, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would give
effect to Employers' expectation that it would participate in the
selection of counsel. Instead, the court used the covenant to
modify an expressed right, and thus trumped the explicit expecta-
tions of the parties.
In short, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
Alaska has become increasingly concerned with notions of
furthering social policy. The covenant, in its correct usage, is an
implied obligation of both parties to refrain from acting to deprive
the other of the reasonably expected benefits of the contract. That
is, it acts to obligate each party to perform the expected duties
emanating from the contract, rather than, as the Alaska Supreme
115. Id. at 1129 (Compton, J., dissenting).
116. The holding that the insured shall have the right to select independent
counsel is not, in and of itself, objectionable. But see Sutherland, supra note 107.
Certainly, the court could have recognized such a right on the grounds of
contractual unconscionability. The use of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to modify and override the explicit intentions and expectations of the
parties, however, is inconsistent with the conception of the implied covenant as
deriving from and defined by the expectations of the parties.
117. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1124 (citations omitted) (Moore, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 1125 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119. Id at 1122 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Court sometimes states, to "impos[e] duties above and beyond
express contractual duties."'2
C. Recognition of the Tort of Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Through the evolution of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the state, the Alaska Supreme Court has held
that, in certain circumstances, a breach of the implied covenant
sounds in tort. The court first recognized this tort in State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson.'2  Drawing upon cases from
California," Arizona,"23 Idaho 24 and Texas17 that recog-
nize tort liability for bad faith breach in the insurance context, the
court reasoned that this type of contract merits greater public
policy concern, and thus should be accorded greater protection
through the implied covenant:
"The adhesionary aspects of the insurance contract, including the
lack of bargaining strength of the insured, the contract's
standardized terms, the motivation of the insured for entering
into the transaction and the nature of the service for which the
contract is executed, distinguish this contract from most other
non-insurance commercial contracts. These features characteris-
tic of the insurance contract make it particularly susceptible to
public policy considerations."" 6
Sounding in tort rather than contract, breach of the implied
covenant is not limited to damages foreseeable at the time of
breach, but instead, includes a reasonable amount to compensate
the injured plaintiff for all the detriment caused by the defendant's
wrongful conduct. 27 Given that statutory remedies were also
inadequate in Nicholson,"28 the court stated that "[t]he availability
120. Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1329 (Alaska
1993) (Compton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
121. 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989).
122. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
123. Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1981).
124. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986).
125. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
126. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152,1157 (Alaska
1989) (quoting Charles M. Louderback & Thomas W. Jurika, Standards for
Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 200-01
(1982)).
127. Id. at 1156 (citing White, 730 P.2d at 1017-18).
128. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.010-21.36.420 (1993) (the court stated that the
statutory remedies failed to compensate the insured for damages incurred due to
a bad faith denial of coverage, and that the statutory scheme enacted by the
legislature failed to provide sufficient incentive to insurers to honor the implied
covenant).
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of a tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
will provide needed incentive to insurers to honor their implied
covenant to their insureds."'129
Following Nicholson, the Alaska Supreme Court has expanded
the tort of bad faith breach slightly beyond the insurance context.
In Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity
Insurance Co.,130 the court recognized the existence of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing between a surety and its
obligee on payment and performance bonds. Relying on Nicholson
and Arizona precedent, 3' the court reasoned that in both the
insurance and surety contexts:
"[T]here is a great disparity of financial resources. Additionally,
issuers of financial responsibility bonds are companies clearly
affected with a public interest. Moreover, to insulate the issuer
of a financial responsibility bond from liability for the deliberate
refusal to pay its obligations arising from the bond is to encour-
age the routine denial of payment of claims for as long as possi-
ble. 132
Consequently, policy concerns also supported tort liability for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
between a surety and its obligee.
Prior to Nicholson, the court had declined to recognize tort
liability for a breach of the implied covenant between an insurer
and a third-party claimant. In O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence
Washington Insurance Co.,133 a lumber company sought damages
from an insurance company for the poor handling of two prior
claims. The court affirmed the granting of summary judgment
against the lumber company, concluding that the duty of good faith
"is a product of the fiduciary relationship created by the contract
between the insurer and the insured.' ' "M Distinguishing the policy
concerns in the first-party insurance context later identified in
Nicholson, the court in O.K Lumber reasoned that "[w]hile liability
insurance is intended to benefit one who is injured under circum-
stances giving rise to liability, it does not follow that the contractual
129. Nicholson, 777 P.2d at 1157. For other cases affirming the tort of bad-faith
breach in the insurance context, see Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855
P.2d 1321 (Alaska 1993) and Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936
(Alaska 1990).
130. 797 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990).
131. Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 778 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. 1989).
132. Loyal Order of Moose, 797 P.2d at 627 n.8 (quoting Dodge, 778 P.2d at
1243).
133. 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988).
134. Id. at 526.
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duties owed by the insurer to the insured can be equated with the
obligations owed to the injured claimant."'3
Similarly to its decision in O.K. Lumber, the court held in
ARCO Alaska, Ina v. Akers'36 that an employment-context
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
not sound in tort. Noting that punitive damages are generally
disfavored by the law, the court held that "[w]here a party's
conduct in breaching a contract rises to the level of a traditionally
recognized tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
an action in tort would lie. Mere breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, however, does not constitute a
tort."
137
More recently the court has also refused to expand tort
liability for breach of the implied covenant to the context of
ordinary commercial disputes. In State v. Transamerica Premier
Insurance Co., 38 a surety for a contractor sought tort damages
from the State of Alaska, claiming that the State, in an attempt to
destroy the contractor through expensive litigation, had denied all
of the extra costs that resulted from erroneous plans and specifica-
tions.139 Affirming the grant of summary judgment for the State,
the court distinguished the commercial context from the special
relationship between the insured and the insurer in Nicholson:
"[The] exceptional features of the insurance contract justified the
creation of a tort action for an insurer's bad faith breach....
Creating a broader tort remedy would disrupt the certainty of
commercial transactions and allow parties to escape contractual
allocation of losses."" Hence, recognition of tort liability for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has
been limited to the insurance context and to the surety-obligee
relationship, where public policy colors the meaning of the implied
covenant.
D. The Court's Inconsistent Standard for Breach of the Covenant
While grappling with the boundaries of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, the Alaska Supreme Court has also
struggled with defining the standard required to amount to a
135. Id.
136. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
137. Id. at 1154.
138. 856 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1993).
139. Id. at 769.
140. Id. at 774. Among the insurance contract's "exceptional features"
mentioned by the court were the use of standardized terms, the insurer's superior
bargaining power and the fact that the insured seeks protection rather than
commercial gain. IL
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breach of this covenant. The court has wavered between applying
three seperate standards. First, the court applied a mainly
subjective test for determining a breach of the implied covenant.
Later, the court incorporated an objective analysis to be applied in
addition to its subjective inquiry. More recently, the court has
moved toward applying a purely objective standard for determining
a breach of the implied covenant. As a result of the court's failure
to consistently apply a single test for determining a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the law has been
left in a state of uncertainty.
In Mitford v. de Lasala,4' the court suggested that subjective
bad faith was at least partially required for a breach, holding that
the covenant is violated in the employment context if an employee
is terminated "for the purpose of preventing him from sharing in
future profits" that he or she was entitled to under the employment
contract. 42 Later, in Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First National
Bank of Anchorage,43 the court reiterated the subjective stan-
dard, holding that a client would be liable for attorney's fees "if it
can be shown that the [client's] decision to settle or not settle [the
case] was made with the intent of taking advantage of the attor-
ney.'' 4  Thus, the court seemed to be establishing subjective
motive as the basis for its analysis in determining a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 45
In Luedtke II,46 the court construed Mitford and Hagans to
stand for the principle that "if it is proved that an employer's
motive in firing an employee is to deprive the employee of the
economic benefits of the contract, it is per se a bad faith termina-
tion." 47 The court, however, expanded its analysis by interpret-
ing Alaska Statutes section 45.02.103(a)(2) to mean that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing "imposes an objective
[standard of good faith] as well as a subjective standard.' 48
141. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
142. Id. at 1007.
143. 783 P.2d 1164 (Alaska 1989).
144. Id. at 1168.
145. See also Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1969) (holding
that secured party, even assuming that he owed an obligation of good faith to
creditors of sublessee of certain equipment, was not acting in bad faith because no
evidence of intention to mislead the creditors).
146. 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992).
147. Id. at 1224. The court also cited Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp.,
779 P.2d 783, 789 (Alaska 1989), for a general definition of the covenant.
148. Luedtke HI, 834 P.2d at 1224 (citations omitted). Alaska Statutes section
45.02.103(a)(2) defines "good faith" to mean "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." ALASKA STAT.
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Thus, while "subjective bad faith is not always required ... the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing ... requires that the
employer be objectively fair."'149
A subjective component of good faith also initially appeared
to be incorporated into the standard for tortious breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Loyal Order of Moose,
Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Insurance Co.,' for example,
the court declared that subjective motive was relevant to the breach
of the covenant: "The surety's demand for arbitration may not itself
be made in bad faith, or serve to defeat an otherwise timely and
sufficient bad-faith claim."'' Thus, bad faith was established as
a component of the inquiry into tortious breach of the covenant.
Most recently, however, the Alaska Supreme Court seems to
have adopted a new, purely objective standard for tortious breach
of the covenant. In Hillman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
Co.,152 the court stated:
"The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded
would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence
of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, i.e., would a reason-
able insurer under the circumstances have denied or delayed
payment of the claim under the facts and circumstances."153
This objective standard allowed the court to affirm summary
judgment for the insurance company because the company's
"decisions to deny coverage and then to demand arbitration were
reasonable."' 4 In his partial dissent, however, Justice Compton
pointed out that there was evidence of subjective bad faith in the
conduct of the insurer: "[A] reasonable jury could conclude that by
failing to investigate, lying to the policy holder and stonewalling for
four years, Nationwide acted with subjective bad faith."'155 Justice
Compton argued that the court's standard must recognize that
"[t]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that
contractual rights be pursued with subjective good faith."'56
Justice Compton concluded his criticism of the standard adopted by
the majority by stating that "[t]he covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is meaningless if existence of a reasonable contractual basis
§ 45.02.103(a)(2) (1993).
149. Luedtke If, 834 P.2d at 1225 (citations omitted).
150. 797 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990).
151. Id. at 629.
152. 855 P.2d 1321 (Alaska 1993).
153. Id. at 1324 (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368,377
(Wis. 1978)).
154. Id. at 1328.
155. Id. at 1331 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
156. Id. at 1329 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
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for denial of liability is alone sufficient to defeat a bad faith
claim. , ,'
57
Hillman effectively left the standard required to show a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing uncertain.
The court must clarify whether a showing of subjective bad faith is
still relevant, or whether it is applicable only outside of tortious bad
faith claims, or perhaps only outside of the insurance context.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT
A particular jurisdiction's interpretation of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can produce serious
consequences for the regional economy. An expansive obligation
subjects bargains to inconsistent and uncertain enforcement,
tending to breed cumulative litigation. Moreover, because a broad
principle of good faith based on public policy necessarily introduces
an element of uncertainty, due to shifting policy concerns and
inconsistent application, the risks and costs associated with contract
formation are increased.'58 Each of these effects of an expansive
and vague interpretation of the covenant could adversely inhibit the
growth of a regional economy, as business leaders are likely to
choose to do business in areas where the law is more certain and
economically efficient. This concern is particularly salient to
Alaska, where as one author points out, "[like other faltering oil-
based economies, Alaska's long-term prosperity hinges on industrial
diversification, which, in turn, depends partly upon the influx of
new business.'5 59  Recent economic forecasts have predicted
relatively flat growth for the Alaska economy over the next twenty
years.' 60
To avoid these potential ramifications of the Alaska Supreme
Court's vague and expansive application of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, this note recommends three courses of
action: (1) the court should determine the meaning of the implied
covenant from the facts of each case; (2) the court should abolish
the tortious breach of the implied covenant; and (3) the court
should apply an objective standard in determining a breach of the
implied covenant.
157. Id. at 1330 (citations omitted) (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
158. Gillette, supra note 19, at 651.
159. Owens, supra note 83, at 306.
160. An economist with the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the
University of Alaska, Anchorage, has projected growth of less than one percent
annually for the Alaska economy over the next 20 years. Rose Ragsdale,
Economist: State Faces Little Growth, ALASKA J. COM., Nov. 1, 1993, at 1.
Moreover, most of the new jobs created will be lower-paying and offer fewer
benefits, attracting less stable and more mobile workers. Id.
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A. The Alaska Supreme Court Should Determine the Meaning of
the Implied Covenant from the Facts of Each Case.
The court's troubles in applying the doctrine of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing have stemmed largely from
its proclivity to announce broad and potentially ambiguous
formulations of the covenant. Due to its fact-specific nature, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not lend itself to such
broad definitions. The expansive interpretations announced by the
court have only led to greater uncertainty as to what the covenant
means in a given context. The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing should always be defined contextually, deriving its
meaning from the reasonable expectations and intentions of the
contracting parties. In framing the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the court must take a more aggressive position
with these expectations by delving into the facts and circumstances
of the formation of the contract at issue.
Moreover, greater reliance on a fact-specific analysis of the
covenant would lend greater credibility and stability to the court's
use of the covenant. In Luedtke 1,161 the court balanced the
public policy interest of employee privacy against the public
concern of health and safety in determining that urinalysis testing
of employees does not violate the implied covenant. 6 2 The more
appropriate interpretation of the covenant would have involved a
determination of the expectations of the employer and the
employee in the particular employment contract, rather than a
balancing of public policies.
Underlying the policy discussion by the court in Luedtke I was
a sufficient factual record to allow the court to reach the same
result without probing into the ambiguities of public policy. While
noting that marijuana use can result in "'impairment of psychomo-
tor control,""' 63 the court could have determined safety to be a
reasonable expectation of the employer due to the nature of the
work on an oil rig. In fact, the court stated that "[w]e also observe
that work on an oil rig can be very dangerous. We have deter-
mined numerous cases involving serious injury or death resulting
from accidents on oil drilling rigs."'" Thus, while the employer
would have an expectation of safety which would allow the testing
of employees for drug use to be a term reasonably implied in the
161. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
163. Luedtke I, 768 P.2d at 1136 (quoting Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 506
(Alaska 1975)).
164. Id. (citations omitted).
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employment contract, the employee would reasonably expect to
have notice of the institution of a drug-testing program "so that he
may contest it, refuse to accept it and quit, seek to negotiate its
conditions, or prepare for the test so that he will not fail it and
thereby suffer sanctions."' 65  With a greater reliance on the
factual record rather than public policy, the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing has more readily apparent boundaries.
A greater reliance on the factual record would also prevent the
court from further overriding the explicit expectations of a contract.
In CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 6 the
insurance contract explicitly expressed a contractual right of the
insurer to participate to some extent in the selection of counsel for
the insured. The court, however, reasoned that the possibly
conflicting interests of the insured and the insurer necessitated that
the insured have the unilateral right to select independent coun-
sel.' 67  A more reasonable interpretation of the contract, in
accordance with the expectations of the parties, would have given
the insurer the right to select independent counsel subject to the
implied covenant. The court's use of the doctrine as a panacea for
public policy "violations," regardless of the explicit intentions in a
contract, only increases uncertainty and commercial distrust of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B. The Alaska Supreme Court Should Abolish the Tortious
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing.
The court has recognized tort liability for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance and surety
contracts.168 The court premised such liability on the supposed
special relationships present in such contracts. The analysis in
these decisions has relied in large part on the reasoning of a 1982
law review article that attempts to define the specific criteria by
which the tort of breach of the implied covenant can be identi-
fied. 69 The authors of that article conclude that the tort should
be recognized where:
(1) [O]ne of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior
bargaining position to the extent that it is able to dictate the
165. Id. at 1137 (citing Richard N. Cook, Note, Drug Testing of Public and
Private Employees in Alaska, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 133, 138-39 (1988)).
166. 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 107-119.
168. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska
1989); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1392 v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 797
P.2d 622 (Alaska 1992).
169. Louderback & Jurika, supra note 126, at 187.
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terms of the contract; (2) the purpose of the weaker party in
entering into the contract is not primarily to profit, but rather to
obtain financial security or peace of mind; (3) the relationship of
the parties is such that the weaker party reasonably andjustifiably places its trust and confidence in the larger entity; and
(4) there is conduct on the part of the stronger contracting party
indicating an intent to frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of
its contract rights. When these circumstances are present, public
policy considerations, the foundation for a tort action, become
operative and the tort of bad faith breach of contract should be
recognized. 70
Based on these four criteria, the Alaska Supreme Court has
allowed for tort liability for breach of the implied covenant in
insurance contracts, but not in employment or other commercial
contracts. Insurance contracts, though, involve no more of a special
relationship than other types of agreements. Additionally, if the
breach of these contracts sounds in tort, risk allocations between
the parties are effectively recast. Thus, the breach of the implied
covenant in the insurance and surety contexts should not sound in
tort.'
1. Relative Bargaining Strength. As discussed above, one
criterion upon which tort liability in the insurance context has been
premised is that the insurer enjoys a superior bargaining position
over the insured, and thus can dictate the terms of the contract.
However, such inequality in bargaining power also occurs in many
situations where the tortious breach of the covenant is not recog-
nized. In many employment contracts, for example, the employer
may have a relatively stronger bargaining position than the employ-
ee, enabling the employer to dictate the terms of the employment
contract. One might also imagine certain sale of goods transactions
where a purchaser would be subject to the standardized terms
provided by a large seller. This is similar to the position of a
purchaser of an insurance policy, who, though not able to dictate
the particular terms, can still select certain amounts and types of
coverage and a deductible amount. In this way, employment and
commercial agreements are susceptible to many of the same public
policy considerations as insurance contracts.172
170. Id. at 189.
171. Professor Farnsworth has generally criticized the doctrine of bad faith
breach: "What better way for courts to justify an award of punitive damages than
to invent a new tort: 'bad faith breach of contract."' E. Allan Farnsworth,
Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CAsE W. RS.
L. REV. 203, 204 (1990).
172. It is notable that legislation regulating labor and the workplace can be seen
as a reflection of the interests of public policy within the relationship between
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2. The Desire to Obtain Financial Security. A second factor
considered relevant to establishing the tortious breach of the
implied covenant in the insurance context is that the purpose of the
weaker party entering into the contract is to obtain financial
security rather than to profit. However, it is also not uncommon
for an employee to seek minimal financial security from the
employment contract. While the loss sustained by the insured
when an insurer breaches the implied covenant by unreasonably
denying a claim may be a greater, single catastrophic loss, the loss
sustained by an employee as a result of the breach of the implied
covenant in an employment contract also impinges on his or her
minimal financial well-being. The loss resulting from a breach of
an insurance contract is analogous to a loss of wealth of the
insured. Sinilarly, the loss incurred as a result of a breach of an
employment contract can be characterized as a loss of future
wealth, as it affects the employee's stream of income.
3. Placement of Trust in the Stronger Party. The third factor
justifying the creation of the tortious breach of the implied
covenant in the insurance context is that there are significant public
policy considerations for protecting a weaker party that has
reasonably and justifiably placed its trust in a stronger party.
Employees, like insured parties, put great confidence and trust in
their employers, and thus potentially allow employers to adjust the
terms of the relationship. As members of a joint enterprise with
the employer, in which both the employer and the employee have
a stake, employees must place trust in the employer. In this
respect, the employer-employee relationship is similar to the
insured-insurer relationship.
4. Conduct Indicating an Intent to Deprive the Weaker Party of
the Benefit of the Contract. The final criterion for identifying the
tortious breach of the implied covenant in the insurance context-a
finding of conduct on the part of the stronger contracting party
indicating an intent to deprive the weaker party of the benefit of
the contract-could be satisfied just as easily in a breach of an
employment or commercial contract as in an insurance contract.
For example, in Mitford v. de Lasala, the court held that
employers and employees. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.60.010-.105 (1991 &
Supp. 1993) (employee safety); 18.80.010-.300 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (discrimina-
tion); 23.10.015-.037 (1990) (fraud against employees); 23.10.040-.047 (1990)
(wages); 23.10.500-.550 (Supp. 1993) (pregnancy, childbirth and family leave);
23.30.005-.270 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (workers' compensation); 44.21.500-.508 (1993)
(equal employment opportunity).
173. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
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discharging an employee with the intent to deprive him from
sharing in future profits in accordance with the contract breached
the implied covenant. Because the breach occurred in the
employment context, however, the court found that it was
nontortious. The court appears merely to be expanding the scope
of tort liability into the insurance context without any sensical
justification.174
5. Other Rationales. Other rationales for tort recovery for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
insurance context, though not discussed by the Alaska Supreme
Court, are equally unsatisfying. In Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp.,7' the California Supreme Court declined to recognize a
tort cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in an employment contract not only because
the employer-employee relationship fails to conform to the "special
relationship" found in insurance contracts, but also because it found
that the insurance contract is unique for three additional reasons.
First, the employee and the insured do not face the same economic
dilemma as a result of a breach of the implied covenant, as the
insured cannot turn to the marketplace to find another insurance
company to pay for the loss already incurred, but the discharged
employee can and must, in order to mitigate damages, seek
alternative employment.'76 This rationale, however, does not
reflect the reality that, particularly in a small labor market, an
employee recently discharged from a past job may find it difficult
to find alternative or commensurate employment. Consequently,
a discharged employee will likely incur a loss not only to income in
the short run, but also to his wealth in the long run, just as would
an injured claimant in an insurance dispute.
Second, the Foley court claimed that the role of the employer
differs from the "quasi-public" function of an insurance compa-
174. In addition to being expansive in allowing for tort recovery for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the "special relationship" test
in Louderback and Jurika's article has been criticized as illusory, as it "opens the
way for pleading a tort cause of action in nearly every contract case, leaving it
ultimately to a jury to decide whether or not the parties had a 'special relation-
ship."' C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees
-Not Tort Liability-Is the Remedy for "Stonewalling," 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 480
(1987) (footnote omitted). See also Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291,
1299-1301 (1985) (criticizing the special relationship test).
175. 765 P.2d 373, 395 (Cal. 1988).
176. Id. at 396.
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ny.'" Although each individual employer does not fulfill an
expansive role in the larger society, employers, in the aggregate,
provide wages that fuel the entire economy and certainly affect
public policy. The public policy considerations in the general
employer-employee relationship are reflected in the immense
volume of regulations affecting the workplace."8
Third, the Foley court stated that the nature of the relationship
in the insurance context is markedly different from the relationship
in the employment situation. The California Supreme Court stated
that while "as a general rule it is to the employer's economic
benefit to retain good employees," the interests of the insured and
the insurer are financially at odds. 9 Again, the analysis of the
court is oversimplified. Both employers and insurance companies,
in general, are profit-maximizing entities. An employer will find it
economically beneficial to retain "good" employees only if it is
profit-maximizing. The incentive to maximize profits may conflict
with the obligation to act fairly and in good faith when, for
example, an employer seeks to discharge an employee to deprive
him of profit-sharing or replaces him with a new employee at a
lower wage. The alleged difference in the nature of the relation-
ship does not explain why tort recovery for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is more appropriate in the
insurance context than in the employment context.
In short, there is no persuasive reason to limit tort recovery to
only the insurance context. But, allowing any tort recovery for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
subjects contractual agreements to greater uncertainty, resulting in
inefficient reallocation of risk.' Such tort recovery is also
inconsistent with the public policies implicated in contractual
damages.81 At most, deprivation of rights under an insurance
177. Id.
178. See supra note 172.
179. Foley, 765 P.2d at 396.
180. See Matthew J. Barrett, Note, "Contort": Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts
-Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 510, 526-27 (1985)
("When courts interject tort remedies into commercial contracts they frustrate the
contracting parties' expectations because in most cases, the parties anticipate
contract damages as the only remedy for purposeful breaches of contract.").
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 355 cmt. a (1981) ("The
purpose[] of awarding contract damages is to compensate the injured party.");
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (1972) ("[I]t is not the policy
of the law to compel adherence to contracts, but only to require each party to
choose between performing in accordance with the contract and compensating the
other party for any injury resulting from a failure to perform.").
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policy could be recognized as a separate, identifiable tort.' 2
Public policy considerations, alone, do not support the different
treatment of a breach of the implied covenant in the insurance
context.
C. The Alaska Supreme Court Should Apply an Objective
Standard in Determining Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
As discussed previously, the Alaska Supreme Court has offered
different standards by which compliance with the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is to be measured.' s3  In some
circumstances, the court has defined a test that encompasses both
subjective and objective good faith, while in others, particularly
with respect to the tort of bad faith breach of the covenant, the
court has espoused a completely objective standard. This inconsis-
tency has led to greater uncertainty as to the meaning of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Because the implied covenant aims to effectuate the reason-
able expectations of the parties as determined by their objective
manifestations of them, the standard of good faith logically should
be an objective one. According to one scholar, an objective
standard has always been the appropriate standard to measure
good faith performance, even prior to the adoption of the U.C.C.:
Good faith performance has always required the cooperation of
one party where it was necessary in order that the other might
secure the benefits of the contract. And the standard for
determining what cooperation was required has always been an
objective standard, based on the decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness of the community and not on the individual's own beliefs as
to what might be decent, fair or reasonable. Both common
sense and tradition dictate an objective standard for good faith
performance.' 4
An objective standard for good faith performance, does not
mean, however, that subjective bad faith would be tolerated in
commercial activity to any greater extent. "A court in evaluating
a litigant's conduct may be required to make a factual investigation
which includes but extends beyond measuring compliance with
182. Because the basis of the tort derives principally from interests of public
policy, it would be most appropriate for the legislature to define this offense. The
original impetus for the judicial creation of the tort of bad faith breach of the
covenant stemmed from the apparent lack of incentive provided by Alaska state
law for insurance companies to honor their implied covenant. Stronger statutory
remedies could easily be provided for with an amendment of the statutes. See
ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.320(d), (e) (1993).
183. See supra part HI.D.
184. Farnsworth, supra note 23, at 672.
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customary commercial or social standards .... The standard for
measuring conduct in contract formation, performance, or enforce-
ment ought to be an elastic one."'" In other words, the court
would make a broad factual inquiry to determine the reasonable
expectations of the parties to each particular contract. In almost all
cases, the court would find an expectation that each party could not
act with subjective bad faith to deprive the other of the benefit of
the contract. Thus, subjective bad faith simply would be encom-
passed by the objective expectations that define the implied
covenant of good faith. By measuring good faith performance
according to an objective standard, the Alaska Supreme Court
would not only comply with logical sense, but would bring greater
certainty to the meaning of the implied covenant.
V. CONCLUSION
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing acts as an
implied promise that neither party to a contract will act so as to
deprive the other party of the expected benefits of the contractual
bargain. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine so as to effectuate public policy concerns. The court must
refrain from this action and settle on a definition of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that respects the reasonable
intentions and expectations of the contracting parties. Upon
adopting such a definition, the court properly could focus on the
facts of each case to determine the expectations and, hence, the
particular obligation of good faith. Such a focus on contractual
expectations should also be accompanied by the elimination of the
tort of bad faith breach of the covenant. Contractual expectations
and policy implications are no different in insurance contracts than
other types of contracts. Rather than expanding the field of tort
liability to encompass all contracts, the court should abolish the
tortious breach of the implied covenant because it leads to
inefficient allocation of risk in contractual agreements generally.
Finally, the focus on contractual expectations would also lend itself
to an objective standard for determining a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which would alleviate
uncertainty in this area of the law. In order to bring stability to
contract formation in the state, and thus promote the expansion of
commercial activity, the court can no longer employ the doctrine
to further policy goals while overriding the expectations of
contracting parties.
Jason Randal Erb
185. Holmes, supra note 21, at 405.
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